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ABSTRACT
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims
to allow the parties to learn the output of function f of their private
inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol
realizes a trusted oracle that computes f and returns the result
to both parties. There have been tremendous strides in efficiency
over the past ten years, yet 2P-SFE protocols remain impractical for
most real-time, online computations, particularly on modestly pro-
visioned devices. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides
hardware-protected execution environments, called enclaves, that
may be viewed as trusted computation oracles. While SGX provides
native CPU speed for secure computation, previous side-channel
and micro-architecture attacks have demonstrated how security
guarantees of enclaves can be compromised.
In this paper, we explore a balanced approach to 2P-SFE on SGX-
enabled processors by constructing a protocol for evaluating f
relative to a partitioning of f . This approach alleviates the burden
of trust on the enclave by allowing the protocol designer to choose
which components should be evaluated within the enclave, and
which via standard cryptographic techniques. We describe SGX-
enabled SFE protocols (modeling the enclave as an oracle), and
formalize the strongest-possible notion of 2P-SFE for our setting.
We prove our protocol meets this notion when properly realized.
We implement the protocol and apply it to two practical problems:
privacy-preserving queries to a database, and a version of Dijkstra’s
algorithm for privacy-preserving navigation. Our evaluation shows
that our SGX-enabled SFE scheme enjoys a 38x increase in perfor-
mance over garbled-circuit-based SFE. Finally, we justify modeling
of the enclave as an oracle by implementing protections against
known side-channels.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Formal security models; Privacy-
preserving protocols; Hardware-based security protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Secure function evaluation (SFE) describes the process of multiple
parties collectively computing a function and receiving its out-
put without learning the inputs from any other party. Originally
proposed in the 1980s, SFE was primarily of theoretical interest
until the 2000s, when practical implementations of two-party SFE
(2P-SFE) became available. Since then, interest in the space has
dramatically increased and the costs of computation have been
lowered by orders of magnitude.
Despite this success in reducing the costs of SFE, it is still not
yet sufficiently practical to be used in applications where (near)
real-time performance is required. This is in large part due to the
substantial number of cryptographic operations that the parties
need to perform. In the 2P-SFE case, this is often manifested by
representing the function to be computed over as a circuit and
garbling all of its input and output wires, as well as truth tables
associated with each logic gate.
Hardware support for secure computing offers a chance to re-
duce these costs. Specifically, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) provides secure memory regions (called enclaves) inside
which code and data can live outside of the purview of the operat-
ing system or system administrator. This platform thus offers the
potential to enable SFE without the often crippling overheads of
the associated cryptographic constructions. While SGX provides
native CPU speed for secure computation, previous side-channel
and micro-architecture attacks have demonstrated how security
guarantees of enclaves can be compromised. Controlled-channel
attacks [67] leverage the page fault handler to leak sensitive infor-
mation inside an enclave. Leaky Cauldron [63] shows memory side
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channel hazards in SGX ranging from TLB to DRAMmodules. Melt-
down [40] and Spectre [33] attacks can also be applied to enclaves,
and Foreshadow [62] has successfully extracted the CPU attestation
key from enclaves thus breaking the SGX remote attestation. Some
of these attacks could be mitigated by microcode update or system
hardening. However, they do expose two important questions:
(1) Is it reasonable to put all secrets into an enclave?
(2) What could we do if SGX might be compromised?
This paper goes beyond simply introducing SGX to SFE [5].
Rather, in addition to reducing the computation required for 2P-SFE
operations, our scheme provides provable assurance that the most
sensitive inputs of either party will remain protected. In summary,
our main contributions1 are as follows:
• Design of Hybrid SFE Scheme: We provide a new con-
struction that considers the partitioning of a function into
multiple segments, some to be executed within an SGX en-
clave and the others within a garbled circuit. We surface
the idea of partitioning a function f as a first-class primi-
tive in the design, as different partitionings induce different
schemes, with different efficiency and trust assumptions.
• Formal Protocol Analysis: We formalize two-party pro-
tocols with an explicit oracle, to support analysis of SFE
protocols that leverage an SGX enclave. We also formalize a
best-possible notion of 2P-SFE for our setting — traditional
2P-SFE is not possible, in general — and prove that our Hy-
brid SFE scheme, properly realized, meets this notion.
• Evaluation and Case Studies: We provide practical sce-
narios for using our SFE schemes, including a database in-
teracting with a client for privacy-preserving queries and
a location-finding scenario with a privacy-preserving Dijk-
stra’s algorithm. Our extensive evaluation demonstrates the
overhead of these operations and shows that in the hybrid
SFE scheme, we increase performance by up to 38x compared
to garbled circuits. We also provide an empirical demonstra-
tion of resilience to controlled-channel attacks.
Outline. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a high-level view of our hybrid approach; Section 3 provides
preliminary notation; Section 4 provides a detailed formal treat-
ment of SGX-enabled SFE; Section 5 defines and analyzes our hybrid
protocol; Section 6 discusses side-channels and mitigations for our
implementation; Section 7 presents the design and implementation
of the protocol schemes within a real SGX environment; Section 8
describes our experimental evaluation; Section 9 considers related
work; and Section 10 concludes.
2 HYBRID APPROACH HIGH-LEVEL VIEW
SGX provides a very efficient platform for secure computation.
However, the trust model associated with SGX is substantially dif-
ferent than with garbled circuits or other cryptographic approaches
to SFE. The secure enclave in which the computation is being per-
formed must attest to the remote party providing data that it is
trustworthy. To do this, the enclave must be issued an identifier
by Intel and must use an attestation service provisioned by Intel.
Unfortunately, Foreshadow attacks have demonstrated that it is
1Our source code will be made available on https://github.com/FICS/smcsgx.
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Figure 1: High-level view of our execution model.
hard to guarantee that the sensitive code and data are running in
a real enclave rather than an emulation environment even if SGX
remote attestation succeeds, leaving alone threats from other side-
channel and micro-architecture attacks. Furthermore, the size of
the enclave is limited by the enclave page cache, which is limited
to approximately 128 MB.2 For these reasons, parties may not want
to rely solely on SGX to compute a function f on their private in-
puts. However, traditional approaches to SFE using garbled circuits,
even using the most efficient schemes, are still orders of magnitude
slower than performing the same operations non-securely.3
We consider the middle ground: parts of the computation of f are
performed using SGX, and parts are performed using traditional
SFE mechanisms. Exactly how one partitions the function is an
efficiency- and security-critical matter. The efficiency viewpoint has
already been touched upon, so we take up the security viewpoint.
Our setting is loosely captured in Figure 1. Alice and Bob would
like to carry out a protocol for 2P-SFE of f (a,b). Alice has black-box
access to an SGX enclave that her environment hosts. (We will jus-
tify this black-box modeling in a moment.) Bob, the remote party,
shares a secret key with the enclave, used to establish a secure
communication channel; Alice has view of this channel, but does
not possess the key. As Alice and Bob carry out the protocol, Alice
will make “queries” to her enclave, asking it to compute interme-
diate functions that are specified by a given partitioning of f . She
provides private input (related to a) as part of these queries, and
Bob provides private input (related to b) via the secure channel.
The results of these enclave queries are visible to Alice, and used
in subsequent parts of the protocol for computing f (a,b).
Thus, intermediate information about the computation of f is
leaked to Alice, even when she participates honestly. This implies
that, in general, the standard notion of 2P-SFE is not possible in this
setting. A bad partitioning of f may result in intermediate values
that leak information about private inputs a and b of Alice and Bob.
2128 MB may be sufficient to run a single application that is not memory-intensive, but
it cannot support entire web servers or databases with substantial memory usage. It is
especially not enough for a cloud environment, in which multiple subscribers must
share the EPC memory of a cloud server. Running multiple full applications would
lead to expensive process-swapping operations, negatively impacting performance.
Besides these performance considerations, the Intel SGX SDK requires developers to
partition programs in order to reduce the TCB contribution of the enclave.
3In certain scenarios, secure computation based on the GMW construction may out-
perform garbled circuit execution [51] but the larger point still remains about the
substantial overhead incurred by privacy-preserving schemes.
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We define, and aim to achieve, the best possible SFE notion in
this setting. Namely, to show that a protocol for computing f (a,b)
leaks nothingmore than f (a,b) and the intermediate values. That is,
2P-SFE with respect to a particular way of partitioning the function.
We formally model an SGX enclave as a black-box, but in reality,
an enclave may leak information about the computations it per-
forms due to timing side channels, memory access patterns, and
controlled-channel attacks on program flow [67]. Enclave malware
was recently demonstrated to be capable of cache attacks on co-
located enclaves, recovering nearly entire RSA private keys within
5 minutes [52]. To support our black-box modeling of an enclave,
we include mitigations for side-channels in our implementations.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In order to design a secure hybrid scheme using SGX, we first in-
troduce the fundamental protocols and their associated notations.
This includes our main protocol involving two parties Alice and
Bob, an introduction to Garbled Circuit (GC) syntax, and finally 1-2
oblivious transfer in the context of this work.
Let domf denote the domain of a function f . We use ε to denote the
empty string. If a and b are strings, let a ∥ b denote their concate-
nation. Let y← $ A(x1, . . .) denote the execution of a randomized
algorithm A on input (x1, . . .) and assigning of the output to y. We
write y ← A(x1, . . .) if A is deterministic. Algorithms are random-
ized unless noted otherwise.
3.1 Protocols
An oracle-relative, two-party protocol Π is a two-party protocol
played by Alice and Bob, in which one or both may have access to
an explicitly defined oracle 𝒪. The parties and the oracle all have
local, private state, which includes a long-term input that is deter-
mined during protocol initialization and accessible across protocol
executions. In our SGX-enabled protocols, the oracle abstracts an
SGX enclave that is part of Alice’s environment, and the long-term
inputs of Bob and the oracle encode a shared key.
Protocols are executed with respect to players’ private inputs.
Executing the protocol on (a,b) means to initiate Alice’s state with
private input a and Bob’s state with private input b, and exchange
messages until both players halt. (We assume each player and the
oracle have been provisioned with their long-term inputs.) This is
denoted (y0,y1,π , st ′) ← $ Π(1k ,a,b, st) where st is the initial state
of𝒪,y0 andy1 are the final states of Alice and Bob respectively, and
st ′ is the final state of 𝒪. String π is a “transcript” of the protocol
execution.4 OutiΠ,k (a,b, st) is the random variable denoting the
final state of player i when executing protocol Π on (a,b) with st as
the oracle’s initial state. (Integer k is the security parameter.) Refer
to Appendix A.1 for more details.
Note that our protocol syntax admits trivially secure SFE pro-
tocols. For us, the oracle provides a way to abstractly capture an
SGX enclave, and our formalization provides a convenient way to
reason about SGX-enabled SFE protocols.5
4The transcript serves no functional purpose, so we omit the details here.
5Although we choose to reason about SGX-enabled SFE protocols with access to an
oracle, it is also possible to prove composition for protocols without oracles.
Adversarial model. We will consider the security of oracle pro-
tocols in the presence of semi-honest (sometimes called honest-but-
curious) adversaries. This means each player executes the protocol
faithfully, but may otherwise act arbitrarily to violate security. All
of our notions ask the adversary to distinguish its view of the pro-
tocol from the output of a simulator, which is given the private
input of the corresponding player (and only the length of the other
player’s private input). Although a semi-honest model may not be
sufficient for certain classes of real-world applications, it offers a
natural first step towards SGX-enabled SFE. In many situations, we
can expect computing parties to have a mutual interest in fulfilling
the protocol correctly. Our model nevertheless does not prevent an
adversary from attempting to break into the enclave.
3.2 Garbling schemes
We adopt the syntax of Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway [9] for gar-
bled circuits. A garbling scheme is a quadruple of algorithms 𝒢 =
(Gb, En,De, Ev); the first is randomized, while the rest are deter-
ministic. The garbling algorithm Gb takes as input 1k and a func-
tion f , and outputs a triple of strings (F , e,d). This is written
(F , e,d) ← $ Gb(1k , f ). String e describes the encoding function, and
X ← En(e,x) denotes the encoding of x under e ; we call X the gar-
bled input. String F describes the garbled function, andY ← Ev(F ,X )
denotes evaluating F on X , yielding the garbled output Y . Finally,
string d describes the decoding function, and y ← De(d,Y ) denotes
the decoding of Y under d , yielding the final output y. The garbling
scheme 𝒢 is correct if for every function f , for every x in the domain
of f , and for every (F , e,d) in the range of Gb(1k , f ), it holds that
f (x) = De(d, Ev(F , En(e,x))).
Garbling circuits were introduced by Andrew Yao [68]. His con-
struction, as well as most recent designs, have an additional syntac-
tic property necessary for SFE. A garbling scheme is called projective
if the encoding algorithm may be written as a pair of algorithms
(EnA, EnB) such that En(e, (a,b)) = EnA(e,a) ∥ EnB(e,b) for every
(a,b) ∈ domf . (See Appendix A.2 for a more formal definition.)
Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway [9] formalize a security notion for
garbling schemes, which we will use here. The privacy of a garbling
scheme captures the adversary’s ability to discern anything about f
or x given only F , X , and d . The notion is parameterized by side
information about the function f — for example, the length of its
encoding, or the topology of the circuit used to compute it. The
adversary is given the side information as input. In the SFE setting,
the side information is f itself. We formalize the simulation-based
privacy notion of [9] in Appendix A.2.
3.3 1-2 oblivious transfer
A standard way of facilitating secure multiparty computation (and
achieving SFE in particular) is to compose a projective garbling
scheme with an oblivious transfer protocol [48]. A 1-2 (one-of-
two) transfer protocol is a two-party protocol in which Alice pos-
sesses two equal-length strings X 0 and X 1 and Bob possesses a
bit b. Roughly speaking, a 1-2 transfer protocol is oblivious if Bob
learns Xb (and only Xb ) and Alice learns nothing. More generally,
Alice may possess a sequence of strings (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ) and
3
a[1]
f2
f1
f3
y0[3] = y1[3]= f(a,b)
st
y0[1],
y1[1]
Alice Bob
y0[2],
y1[2]
a[2]
a[3]
b[1]
b[2]
b[3]
Figure 2: A 3-way even-odd partitioning of function f . Solid
lines are observed; dashed lines are not. Note that partition-
ing describes an organizational structure for computing f ,
but not how these computations are realized. In our proto-
cols, f1, f3 will be computed within an SGX enclave, and f2
via garbling schemes and oblivious transfer.
Bob a string b of length n, and the goal is to obliviously trans-
fer (Xb11 , . . . ,Xbnn ) to Bob. We formalize this security property in
Appendix A.3.
4 SFE FOR PARTITIONED FUNCTIONS
We next describe our construction of SFE for partitioned functions.
Our main protocol partitions the computation of a function into a
sequence of round functions, each depending on a piece of the play-
ers’ private input. Odd-round functions are evaluated within Alice’s
enclave and may depend on its state. Even-round functions are
stateless and evaluated using standard cryptographic techniques.
We first give the syntax of an partitioning scheme that captures
this computational model.6 We then define secure evaluation of a
function relative to a partitioning of it, which captures the interme-
diate results available to Alice and Bob.
4.1 ℓ-way even-odd partitioning schemes
Let ℓ be a positive integer and f be a function of two inputs and
two outputs. An ℓ-way even-odd partitioning scheme 𝒫 for f is a
sequence of round functions (f1, . . . , fℓ) and a pair of probabilistic
algorithms (SpA, SpB). Let (a,b) ∈ domf and k be a positive integer.
On input (1k ,a), algorithm SpA outputs an ℓ-vector of strings a.
Similarly, on input (1k ,b), algorithm SpB outputs an ℓ-vector of
strings b. These are the local inputs of Alice and Bob, respectively.
Even-round function evaluations are stateless, while odd-round
function evaluations carry state from one odd-round to the next.
6Our aim is to demonstrate the possibility of combining SGX and Garbled Circuits for
SFE, given a proper partitioning scheme. Partitioning is itself a hard problem that we
do not attempt to solve; entire papers [16, 69] have been dedicated to it. Four possible
partitioning schemes for SGX programs are explored by Atamli-Reineh and Martin [3],
ranging from the naïve placement of entire applications in an enclave to separating
out sensitive components into individual enclaves.
Exec𝒫,k (a, b)
a← $ SpA(1k , a); b← $ SpB(1k , b); st, y0[0], y1[0] ← ε
for j ← 1 to ℓ do
u ← a[j] ∥ y0[j − 1]; v ← b[j] ∥ y1[j − 1]
if j is odd then (y0[j], y1[j], st) ← fj (u, v, st)
else (y0[j], y1[j]) ← fj (u, v)
return (a, b, y0, y1)
Figure 3: Execution of partitioning scheme 𝒫 on input (a,b).
Note that prior outputs are concatenated to the inputs of the
next round function.
This allows us to model stateful SGX computation. Even-numbered
functions map two strings (Alice and Bob’s local inputs) to two
strings (Alice and Bob’s outputs), and odd-numbered functions
map three strings (Alice and Bob’s local inputs, and the state of the
oracle) to three strings (Alice and Bob’s outputs and the oracle’s
updated state).
We define the execution of 𝒫 in Figure 3. (See Figure 2 for an
illustration.) The partitioning scheme 𝒫 is correct for f if for every
positive integer k and every (a,b) ∈ domf , it holds that
Pr
[(a, b, y0, y1) ← $ Exec𝒫,k (a,b) : (y0[ℓ], y1[ℓ]) = f (a,b) ] = 1.
We define ℐ as the 1-way even-odd partitioning scheme defined
for every function f as follows. Let (a,b) ∈ domf and k be a
positive integer. On input (1k ,a), algorithm ℐ .SpA outputs a 1-
vector containing a, and on input (1k ,b), algorithm ℐ .SpB outputs
a 1-vector containing b. Correctness demands that ℐ . f1 = f . We
call ℐ the identity partition.
4.2 Partition-relative (2P)-SFE
Let f be a function of two inputs and two outputs and let𝒫 be a par-
titioning scheme for f . Syntactically, a protocol Π for evaluating f
relative to 𝒫 is an oracle protocol played by Alice and Bob with the
following correctness condition: for each i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, every
positive integer k , and every (a,b) ∈ domf , where (yAlice,yBob) =
f (a,b), it holds that
Pr
[
a← $ 𝒫 .SpA(1k ,a); b← $ 𝒫 .SpB(1k ,b) :
OutiΠ,k (a, b, ε) = yi
]
= 1 ,
Defining SFE. Our base notion of SFE will be stated relative to
a given partitioning scheme and admits the traditional notion of
SFE as a special case. We formalize the idea that a protocol securely
evaluates a function (relative to a partitioning of that function) if
nothing is leaked to either party beyond that which follows from
its own local inputs and outputs.7 To do so, we insist that each
party’s view of the protocol’s execution can be computed without
interacting with the other party.
Let f be a function,𝒫 be a partitioning scheme for f , and Π be an
oracle protocol for evaluating f relative to 𝒫 . Security is captured
by the game defined in the top-left panel of Figure 9 (located in the
Appendix). We sketch the notion here. The security experiment is
7If Alice’s or Bob’s private input is leaked in the intermediate values, this is a failure
of the partitioning, not of the SFE protocol.
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associated to player i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, adversary𝒜, simulator 𝒮 , and
security parameter k . The goal of the adversary is to distinguish the
view of player i from the output of 𝒮 , which is given f , player i’s
local inputs and outputs, and only the length of the other player’s
inputs and outputs. To begin, the adversary chooses a pair of inputs
(a,b) ∈ domf and the inputs are split according to 𝒫 . A challenge
bit c is chosen. If c = 1, then the protocol is executed and the
adversary is handed i’s view of the protocol execution, derived
from the transcript; if c = 0, then the simulator is executed and the
adversary is given its output. The adversary wins if it outputs c .
The advantage of 𝒜 in the game instantiated with simulator 𝒮 at
security parameter k is defined as
AdvsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 2 · Pr
[
ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
− 1.
We say that Π securely evaluates f relative to 𝒫 if for each i ∈
{Alice,Bob} and every polynomial-time𝒜, there exists a polynomial-
time 𝒮 such that AdvsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) is negligible as a function of
the security parameter k . We refer to such a protocol as an SFE-
secure protocol for f relative to 𝒫 .
When 𝒫 = ℐ , our notion reduces to standard SFE, and we sim-
ply say that Π securely evaluates f , dropping the reference to the
partitioning.
5 HYBRID SFE-SGX
Now having discussed our model for Secure Function Evaluation
(SFE) on a partitioned function, we extend this to the context of
computing using Intel SGX. It is critical that we define our own
syntax and construction, despite formalisms already existing [5, 58],
as there is no previous work that partitions Secure Multiparty Com-
putation between SGX hardware and traditional Garbled Circuits.
Let 𝒫 be an ℓ-way even-odd partitioning of f , where f1, . . . , fℓ
are the round functions. The main technical result of this section
says, loosely, that if one possesses protocols for securely evaluat-
ing f1, . . . , fℓ , then these can be composed to give a protocol for
securely evaluating f relative to the information leaked by the compo-
nent functions. This result highlights the need to carefully consider
how f , and the private inputs a,b, are partitioned. Concretely, one
may have a protocol for securely computing f1(a1,b1, st), which
leaks nothing more about a1,b1, st than f1 does itself. But f1 may,
for example, leak all of a1. The claimed implication will hold, but
if a1 = a, there is no security in the classical sense of SFE.8
Before we can state our main result, we define (as technical tools)
syntax and security notions for protocols for even- and odd-round
function evaluations.
Even-round protocols. An even-round protocol Π is an oracle
protocol played by Alice and Bob for evaluating functions of two
inputs and two outputs. We write Π[f ] to denote the protocol
instantiated with a particular function f . Correctness demands
that for each i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, every (a,b) ∈ domf , and every
positive integer k , it holds that Pr[OutiΠ[f ],k (a,b) = yi ] = 1 where
(yAlice,yBob) = f (a,b). We consider the SFE security of even-round
protocols relative to the identity partition.
8We note that this particular leakage is ameliorated if a1 itself leaks no efficiently
computable information about a, e.g., a1 is an encryption of a under a secret key.
Πhyb[𝒫, Πo, Πe](1k , a, b)
(1) Let st, y0[0], y1[0] ← ε . For each j from 1 to ℓ, do as follows:
let u = a[j] ∥ y0[j − 1] and v = b[j] ∥ y1[j − 1]. If j is odd, then
execute
(y0[j], y1[j], π , st) ← $ Πo[𝒫 .fj ](1k , u, v, st) ;
otherwise, execute
(y0[j], y1[j], π , st′) ← $ Πe[𝒫 .fj ](1k , u, v, ε ) .
(2) Alice halts with private state y0[ℓ] and Bob halts with private
state y1[ℓ].
Figure 4: The hybrid SFE-SGX protocol, an oracle protocol
for evaluating f constructed from ℓ-way even-odd partition-
ing scheme 𝒫 for f , odd-round protocol Πo, and even-round
protocol Πe.
Odd-round protocols. An odd-round protocol Π is an oracle
protocol played by Alice and Bob for evaluating functions of three
inputs and three outputs. We write Π[f ] to denote the protocol
instantiated with a particular function f . Correctness demands
that for each i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, every (a,b, st) ∈ domf , and every
positive integer k , it holds that Pr[OutiΠ[f ],k (a,b, st) = yi ] = 1,
where (yAlice,yBob, st ′) = f (a,b, st) for some st ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Defining SFE-ODD. We introduce a new security notion for odd-
round protocols. The main distinction from standard SFE is that the
adversary specifies the oracle’s initial state. Security of odd-round
protocols is defined in the top-right panel of Figure 9 (located in the
Appendix). We define the advantage of adversary 𝒜 in the game
instantiated with simulator 𝒮 as
Advsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 2 · Pr
[
Expsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
− 1.
We say that Π is an SFE-ODD-secure protocol for f if for
each i ∈ {Alice,Bob} and every polynomial-time adversary 𝒜,
there exists a polynomial-time simulator 𝒮 such that the func-
tion Advsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) is negligible as a function of f .
5.1 The hybrid SFE-SGX protocol
Our main protocol is defined in Figure 4. Let f be a function of
two inputs and two outputs and let 𝒫 be an ℓ-way even-odd parti-
tioning scheme for f . The protocol is composed from 𝒫 , an odd-
round protocol Πo, and an even-round protocol Πe. The protocol
is defined on ℓ-vectors a and b corresponding to Alice and Bob’s
respective split inputs. They first execute Πo[𝒫 . f1] with private
inputs (a[1], b[1]) with oracle Πo.𝒪. As a result, Alice gets y0[1],
Bob gets y1[1], and the oracle’s state gets updated to st where
(y0[1], y1[1], st) = 𝒫 . f1(a[1], b[1], ε). Next, they execute Πe[𝒫 . f2]
on private inputs (a[2] ∥ y0[1], b[2] ∥ y1[1]) and with oracle Πe.𝒪.
Alice gets y0[2] and Bob gets y1[2] as a result. Alice and Bob con-
tinue in this way, alternating between odd-round and even-round
evaluations. Correctness of 𝒫 ensures that (y0[ℓ], y1[ℓ]) = f (a,b).
We instantiate the even-round protocol using standard tech-
niques from GC-based SFE and specify an example, constructed
from a projective garbling scheme and a 1-2 transfer protocol, in
Figure 5. This protocol does not make use of an oracle, relying only
on the security of its constituent cryptographic primitives.
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Πgc[f , 𝒢, Πot](1k , a, b)
Init(1k ): return (ε, ε, ε )
(1) Alice generates the circuit (F , e, d ) ← $ Gb(1k , f ), computes
A← EnA(e, a), and sends (F , A) to Bob.
(2) Let e = (X 01 , X 11 , . . . , X 0n, X 1n ). Execute
(ε, B, π , st′) ← $ Πot(1k , e, b, ε ).
(Note that B = EnB(e, b).)
(3) Bob computes Y ← Ev(F , A ∥ B) and sends Y to Alice.
(4) Alice computes y ← De(d, Y ).
(5) Alice halts on y and Bob halts on ε .
Figure 5: An even-round protocol constructed from a pro-
jective garbling scheme 𝒢 = (Gb, En, Ev,De) and 1-2 transfer
protocol Πot. See Appendix A.1 for the semantics of Init.
Πsgx[f , Γ](1k , a, b, st)
Init(1k ): K ← $𝒦; return (ε, K, K )
(1) Bob computes c ← $ ℰK (b) and sends c to Alice.
(2) Alice asks (f , a, c) of𝒪(K, ·).
(3) On input (K, (f , a, c)) and with current state st, oracle𝒪 com-
putes b ← 𝒟K (c), (y, st) ← f (a, b, st), and returns y to
Alice.
(4) Alice halts on y and Bob halts on ε .
Figure 6: A odd-round protocol constructed from a symmet-
ric encryption scheme Γ = (𝒦, ℰ ,𝒟) and the SGX module,
modeled as an oracle queried by Alice. See Appendix A.1 for
the semantics of Init.
Finally, we instantiate the odd-round protocol using the SGX
module (modeled as an oracle) and a symmetric encryption scheme
Γ = (𝒦, ℰ ,𝒟). (SGX uses AES-GCM with a random initialization
vector. See Appendix A.4 for syntax and security notions for sym-
metric encryption.) The protocol is defined in Figure 6. Bob shares
a key with Alice’s enclave. To evaluate a function f on (a,b), Bob
encrypts b and sends it to Alice, who then sends the function, her
own input, and Bob’s ciphertext to the SGX module. The module
decrypts b, evaluates the function (which depends on its internal
state), then returns the result to Alice.
The hybrid SFE-SGX protocol instantiated with Πsgx and Πgc is
useful for evaluating functions whereby Alice gets the result and
Bob gets nothing. More precisely,Πhyb[𝒫,Πsgx,Πgc] is well-defined
when 𝒫 is an even-odd partitioning of a function f such that for
every (a,b) ∈ domf , it holds that f (a,b) = (y, ε) for some string y.
This is not always desirable; in some applications, Bob should re-
ceive the final result. To address this, we specify the dual protocol
of hybrid SFE-SGX, whereby Bob learns all of the intermediate
results, including the final result, and Alice learns nothing.
5.2 The dual hybrid SFE-SGX protocol
Let f be a function of two outputs and two inputs such that for
every (a,b) ∈ domf , there exists a stringy such that f (a,b) = (ε,y).
Let𝒫 be an even-odd partitioning scheme for f . Protocol Π′gc is like
its dual Πgc, except that Alice also sends Bob the stringd , the means
to decode, in step 1. In step 3, Bob computes Y ← Ev(F ,A ∥ B)
and decodes y ← De(d,Y ) and halts on y. Alice halts on output
ε . Protocol Π′sgx is like its dual Πsgx, except that in step 3, after
computing (y, st) ← f (a,b, st), the oracle encrypts y under K and
returns the ciphertext to Alice. Alice transmits the ciphertext to
Bob and halts on ε . Finally, Bob decrypts and halts on y.
Then Πhyb[𝒫,Π′sgx,Π′gc] is, syntactically, a protocol for evalu-
ating f relative to 𝒫 . Unlike its dual, Bob receives the final and
intermediate outputs and Alice receives nothing.9
5.3 Case Study: Database
Having exhaustively defined the necessary partitioning scheme in
developing a hybrid model for SGX, we present two case studies to
demonstrate real-world use of our protocols.
The first of these involves querying a database. Alice provides a
database with n rows, and Bob issues k select queries against it.
Each query retrieves a single 64-bit entry associated with the index
provided as input. The results of the queries are returned to Bob.10
The goal in this setting is to provide the requested entries to Bob
without revealing any queried indices to Alice. Using our hybrid
protocol, Bob would protect his most sensitive queries using GC-
based computation and the less sensitive ones with SGX-enabled
computation. Such a scenario may be practical in the case of a
database implementing a simple Multilevel Security (MLS) scheme,
where data is encoded at one of two levels (i.e., secret, top secret).
This approach would allow the existence of queries to potentially
(but not necessarily) top secret data to be obfuscated, without in-
curring the expense of using garbled circuits for all accesses.
Hybrid Program. This program can be evaluated using the dual
hybrid SFE-SGX protocol. Some portion of the queries entered by
Bob are considered highly sensitive, meaning Bob is especially con-
cerned with not having them revealed. Bob splits his k queries into
two bins corresponding to f1, the SGX portion of the program, and
f2, the GC portion. Alice loads the database into her enclave, which
will evaluate f1, and Bob issues queries against the enclave from his
bin of less-sensitive inputs. Once the requested entries are returned
to Bob, the two parties switch from f1 to f2 by having Alice’s en-
clave pass the database into the garbled circuit as y1, the garbled
version of the database. Bob garbles the inputs corresponding to
his highly sensitive queries by performing 1-2 OT with Alice. Bob
then evaluates the garbled circuit and receives the requested entries
associated with his more sensitive inputs. Alice has no output.
Intuition for Further Rounds. If the output Bob receives in
the second round above advises the next set of data queries, the
program’s evaluation may be extended into further rounds. At this
stage, Alice does not know Bob’s GC output from the prior round,
9Some applications may require both Alice and Bob to receive intermediate and final
outputs. We note that our hybrid SFE-SGX and dual hybrid SFE-SGX protocols would
behave like traditional GC if both parties are given the final output, but intermediate
outputs must be handled more carefully. Intermediate outputs based from odd-rounds
may leak information about the more-sensitive data handled by even-rounds. This is a
line of inquiry beyond the scope of this paper, but it is certainly important.
10Although the database program we architect resembles a simple key-value store,
it offers an initial demonstration that database retrieval is possible according to our
hybrid scheme. No work had previously attempted to combine a database application
across SGX and GC. Our database supports both retrieval and updates to data entries in
a manner which corresponds to GET and SET requests against production databases.
6
Dijkstra Hybrid
SGX Garbled Circuit
A
E F
H
LG
K
L
G
H
J
B
Inside Sensitive Graph
?
??
?
K
J
Sensitive Graph
C
D
Figure 7: A hybrid Dijkstra graph is partitioned into two
parts. The majority of the shortest path is found by the hy-
brid SFE-SGX computation; the sensitive part of the route is
computed using garbled circuits.
but any future queries, if dependent on this intermediate output,
may leak information to Alice about Bob’s sensitive inputs. If there
are many result sets which could have advised Bob’s next set of
queries (or if f2 was empty), Bob may continue as before, splitting
his queries into two bins corresponding to f1 and f2, participating in
another series of odd- and even-rounds. Otherwise (if Bob’s next set
of queries could only be a result of a few specific outputs from the
initial GC round), all subsequent queries must be made exclusively
in even-rounds (by emptying f1 or filling it with dummy queries).
5.4 Case Study: Dijkstra’s Shortest-Path
Our second case study uses Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm. This
algorithm finds the shortest path between two nodes in a graph.
Again, there are two parties, Alice and Bob. The graph topology is
known to both Alice and Bob, but only Bob knows the edge weights.
Bob provides as input the graph’s edge weights, and Alice inputs
the starting and ending points. The goal of SFE in this setting is
for Alice to receive the shortest path from her starting point to her
ending point while not learning Bob’s edge weights.
Hybrid Program. This program is evaluated using the standard
hybrid SFE-SGX protocol. Some subset of the nodes in the graph
make up a highly-sensitive portion of the map (graph), and Bob is
especially concerned with not having the edge weights incident to
them revealed while routing through that portion of the map. The
highly-sensitive portion will be routed solely in a garbled circuit
during f2, whereas the less-sensitive portion will be routed within
the SGX module during f1. The final route may contain nodes from
both portions (Figure 7 demonstrates how a graphmay contain both
highly-sensitive and less-sensitive portions). Any route through
the graph is allowed to travel into and out of the sensitive part of
the graph a single time; this is possible by setting edge weights in a
specific way. The path must not start or end in the highly sensitive
part of the graph. This partitioning could be useful in a scenario
where roads traverse private/government property with selective
access, the topological features of which must remain undisclosed.
The initial Dijkstra computation is run as f1 in Alice’s enclave.
Alice’s input to f1 is the starting and ending points, and Bob passes
the less-sensitive edge weights into the enclave. A route through
the non-sensitive portion of the graph is calculated. This route
is returned to Alice from the enclave, though it only covers the
non-sensitive portion of the graph and may not yet be the com-
plete route. Afterward, a garbled circuit is used to route through
the highly-sensitive portion of the graph; the garbled circuit is
evaluated regardless of whether the path goes through the highly-
sensitive portion of the graph. The entrance and exit nodes for the
sensitive portion of the graph are provided by the enclave as y1 to
f2. Alice has no input into f2. Bob’s input into f2 is the collection
of sensitive edge weights. Upon evaluation of the garbled circuit
associated with f2, Alice receives as output the route through the
highly sensitive portion of the graph. Bob has no output.
Intuition for Further Rounds. At the completion of the first
series of rounds, Alice knows a shortest path between her starting
and ending points. This may be part of a larger path, in the case
that there are certain nodes Alice must visit en-route. However,
Alice’s new starting and ending points will not be dependent on
the prior output. More rounds may nevertheless be required if, for
instance, the same node should not be revisited, in which case the
modified graph (with visited nodes removed) will be fed directly
into the next series of rounds while Alice provides her new starting
and ending points (for continuing the path).
5.5 Security of hybrid SFE-SGX
Our main result is that the composition of an odd-round and an
even-round protocol achieves secure function evaluation relative
to a particular partitioning of the function. The following theo-
rem says that as long as the evaluations of even-round functions
are SFE-secure and the evaluations of odd-round functions are
SFE-ODD-secure, then the hybrid SFE-SGX protocol securely eval-
uates function f relative to even-odd partitioning scheme 𝒫 for f .
We discuss proofs of this section’s theorems in Appendices A.5, A.6,
and A.7.
Theorem 5.1. Let f be a function of two inputs and two outputs
and 𝒫 be an ℓ-way even-odd partitioning scheme for f , where ℓ is
a positive integer. Let Πe be an even-round protocol and Πo be an
odd-round protocol. Let Π = Πhyb[𝒫,Πo,Πe] as defined in Figure 4.
If Πo[𝒫 . fj ] is an SFE-ODD-secure protocol for evaluating 𝒫 . fj for
every odd j andΠe[𝒫 . fj ] is an SFE-secure protocol for evaluating𝒫 . fj
for every even j, then Π securely evaluates f relative to 𝒫 .
The following theorem is a standard result, which says that the
composition of a private, projective garbling scheme and a 1-2
oblivious transfer protocol yields secure evaluation of the even-
round functions.
Theorem 5.2. Let f be a function of two inputs and two outputs, 𝒢
be a projective garbling scheme, Πot be a 1-2 transfer protocol, and
let Π = Πgc[f ,𝒢,Πot] as defined in Figure 5. If 𝒢 is private and Πot
is oblivious, then Π is an SFE-secure protocol for f .
This result represents the best-case scenario in the setting where
Alice is given the internal state of her SGX module. Since even-
round evaluations remain secure, she learns nothing beyond that
which follows from the result of each even-round computation and
possession of the inputs Bob sent encrypted to the SGX module.
Lastly, the following theorem says that, viewing the SGX module
as an oracle, secure symmetric encryption suffices for SFE-ODD-
secure evaluation of the odd-round functions. (IND$ refers to the
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standard indistinguishability notion for encryption schemes defined
in Appendix A.4.)
Theorem 5.3. Let f be a function of three inputs and three outputs,
Γ = (𝒦, ℰ ,𝒟) be a symmetric encryption scheme, and let Π = Π[f , Γ]
as defined in Figure 6. If Γ is IND$-secure, then Π is SFE-ODD-secure
for f .
We remark that the protocol Πhyb instantiated with Π′gc and Π′sgx
as the even- and odd-round protocols is also secure. The proof
follows closely the justifications of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3.
In the next section, we justify modeling SGX as a black-box by
addressing side-channel attacks. But first, we remark that even
if these protections do not suffice, our protocol still provides a
measure of assurance. Suppose, in the worst case, that Alice is given
the internal state of her enclave (and hence any keys shared with
Bob). Secure evaluation of f (a,b) is out of reach in this setting, since
Alice learns some of Bob’s local inputs and outputs. Still, Bob’s most
sensitive inputs remain secure (even upon enclave compromise, as
an enclave only handles private inputs for odd-rounds): Alice learns
nothing about them beyond that which follows from knowing the
state of her enclave and the result of the computation.
6 SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK MITIGATIONS
Unfortunately, SGX enclaves suffer from side-channels which may
leak data regarding program execution and data [27, 31, 56]. In
order to continue evaluating our hybrid scheme, we must justify the
oracle assumption on SGX heuristically by using code modifications
to close known side channels.11 These channels are associated with
timing and program flow, which allow an outside observer to infer
what path a program takes during its execution or what memory is
being accessed (due to access times), and memory accesses, where
an attacker observes the parts of RAM accessed by the program.
Timing. We take steps to ensure our programs run for the same
amount of time regardless of the input, underlying values in mem-
ory, or the result. We ensure both branches of every if statement
take the same amount of time and fix loop bounds that could oth-
erwise reveal how many times a loop executes [17]. An example
of this would be to have each branch perform the same amount of
work (e.g., a single assignment to a variable).
Program Flow. Even though if statements take the same amount
of time, controlled-channel attacks [67] on the program flow are
still possible (i.e., if the true code branch causes a instruction page
miss, then this leaks information). To further mitigate these, we
modify all if statements to prevent branches. For example, if(a
== b) c = 1 else c = 2 can be converted into the branch-free
version int t = a == b; t = makeSameAsBit0(t), c = (t
& 1) | ((¬t) & 2), where makeSameAsBit0 sets all bits of t to
the least-significant bit. In the new version, there is no branch that
would reveal information about the program flow.12
Memory Accesses. Any query to a specific array index will reveal
the memory page that was queried if that page faulted. Addition-
ally, cache side channels can reveal to motivated attackers which
11For this work, our mitigations are appliedmanually for each function. The availability
of a tool that automates this process would make it easier to adopt our hybrid protocol.
12Our approach differs from Raccoon [49], which executes multiple program paths on
a given input; instead, we do away with branching paths altogether prior to execution.
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Figure 8: A display of memory accesses of the database pro-
gram. Top: tree-based ORAM; middle: linear search. The
three lines on the bottom are unblinded memory accesses.
We queried the memory in order from index 0 to N .
data or code memory addresses are being accessed [12]. To counter
this, we move RAM accesses from programs to a binary search
tree (BST)-based Oblivious RAM (ORAM)-like construction loosely
based on Path ORAM [59]. This modification distributes array ac-
cesses across many randomized memory accesses, as is visually
apparent in Figure 8. The security model for our BST structure is
similar to that of other ORAM systems, but is different in two im-
portant ways: (1) we deal with a trusted module in a compromised,
malicious operating system [50] which may attempt timing-based
attacks, and (2) our modifications are designed to hide program
flow, not just data access patterns.13
Let us briefly summarize the design of our system.
• Our BST forest contains two trees, each with about half
the nodes at any given time and in a sorted order, but no
duplicate entries with the other. Each node has a key-value
pair, where the key is array index and the value is the data.
• Every query for a node must descend through each tree all
the way to a leaf. After the query, each node along the path is
removed, moved to a different RAM location, and randomly
added back into a tree. To hide where each key and data were
moved, we place every deleted node’s data to a contiguous
segment of memory, then randomly swap them using the
const-time and branch-free operations from before.
• To hide the actual query, log(n) queries are issued to each
tree for every real query.
Whenever there is code that may reveal the searched index, we
employ constant-time and branch-free techniques from the program
flow section to hide the information.
13As opposed to traditional (e.g., Path) ORAM, we do not deal with a client/server
setting, in which the server is not trusted to correctly perform the ORAM. The ORAM
functionality within the enclave can be verified during attestation, making it unneces-
sary to maintain the position map and stash in a separate “trusted client.”
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7 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In Section 5, we assumed Alice possessed an SGX module with
which Bob shared a secret key. Here, and in our implementation,
we assume for simplicity that both parties possess an SGX module.
The two modules share a key unknown to either Alice or Bob,
constructed during SGX remote attestation and used to set up a
secure communication channel between the modules. We refer to
the party who executes code in his/her enclave as the evaluator.
The other party is called the sender.
We implement our protocols using Intel’s SGX SDK for Linux
[28]. Rather than simply replacing GC computation using SGX [5],
we provide the first implementation that we are aware of combining
SGX and GC together to perform 2P-SFE, which is essentially a
general form of computation model for 2P-SFE to use SGX. Unlike
previous work [5], we also share our experience of using Intel SDK
with SGX-enabled hardware to develop real-world SFE applications.
Program Partitions. When developing programs for use in the
SGX environment, it is particularly important to understand the
security considerations of code and data use. The first step is to
partition the program into two parts. The trusted partition of the pro-
gram is kept within the enclave, while the remainder is developed
outside of the enclave. This program partitioning is required to min-
imize the application’s trusted computing base and to save enclave
memory. In our experience, the enclave’s memory is fixed by a BIOS
setting.14 This represents a substantially different programming
paradigm from what is required in other SGX-like environments
such as the OpenSGX [30] emulator, where programs of any size
are assumed able to fit entirely within the enclave environment.
All of our SGX test programs are executed inside of the evalua-
tor’s enclave. All other components, such as code to handle sock-
ets and message processing, are kept outside the enclave. In total,
10, 172 SLOC15 were written between the sender and evaluator
enclaves and their accompanying untrusted applications.
Enclave Restrictions. Unlike OpenSGX, where enclave imple-
mentations can take advantage of existing libraries, real enclaves
not only require library code to be statically linked, but also use
trusted libraries. Static linking guarantees each enclave is self-con-
tained and needs no extra libraries to be installed to where it is
deployed. The trusted libraries created by Intel for enclave programs
are crafted to avoid illegal16 instructions (e.g., fprintf) that will
crash enclave programs at runtime. Certain functions (e.g., strcpy)
are excluded, though variants providing similar functionality (e.g.,
strncpy) are often available. Functions that would otherwise access
data outside the enclave (e.g., fopen) are also excluded.
The Intel SGX SDK provides trusted C and C++ libraries, as
well as other trusted libraries (e.g., for SGX runtimes and crypto-
graphic operations). We follow these restrictions, primarily using a
subset of C functions and some basic C++ built-in data structures
(e.g., vector). When needed, we use the SGX SDK trusted libraries
for API replacements or alternate functions. For example, we use
14In our environment, enclave memory was limited to 128 MB.
15Source Lines of Code (SLOC) generated using David A. Wheeler’s ‘SLOCCount.’
16We borrow this verbiage from the official Intel SGX documentation.
sgx_read_rand, which accesses the hardware random number gen-
erator directly, instead of rand. Similarly, we rely on the trusted
libraries’ cryptographic APIs instead of OpenSSL/GnuTLS.
SGX/SDK Restrictions. The SGX remote attestation protocol
relies on Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [1] technology to
verify that the remote enclave is running on an Intel-authenticated,
SGX-enabled CPU. To use EPID, a signed certificate must first be
obtained from a recognized certificate authority and registered
with Intel Development Services. For the purposes of this work,
we do not purchase a certificate for registration with Intel and
do not implement the EPID part of remote attestation. For our
experiments, we instead enable the debug flag when building our
SGX applications to skip EPID. After skipping EPID, the sender in
our setup verifies the measurement of the evaluator’s enclave by
checking the signed value contained in the SGX quote (from the
attestation) against the known “good” quote of the enclave.
We encountered instances where we received errors from SGX
when attempting to create and read data from large enclaves. Unlike
normal programs, enclaves require explicit settings for both stack
and heap size. Both also need to be 4K aligned (a normal page size).
For memory-hungry enclaves, maximum stack and/or heap sizes
must be increased in the enclave configuration file.17
Garbled Circuit Implementation. We used the Frigate semi-
honest garbled circuit compiler and semi-honest protocol implemen-
tation provided by Mood et al. [44]. This implementation is a hand-
tuned version of the garbled circuit system by Kreuter et al. [36];
it uses the point-and-permute [7], garbled row reduction [47], and
free XOR [34] optimizations, amongst many others, to improve
computational efficiency and reduce network bandwidth.
8 EXPERIMENTS
We used three common programs in the SFE literature to eval-
uate the performance of our implementation. We compared our
hybrid SFE-SGX protocol to naïve SGX-enabled SFE (function evalu-
ation in the enclavewithout side-channel protections), SGX-enabled
SFE (with side-channel protections), and standard GC-based SFE.
We tested our implementation on two HP Envy360 laptops with
Intel quad core i7-6500U CPUs at 2.50GHz with a 64KB L1 cache,
512KB L2 cache, 4MB L3 cache and 8 GB RAM. Both machines were
connected on a VLAN to the same switch via Gigabit Ethernet.
8.1 Test Programs
The two programs used for evaluation of our hybrid SFE-SGX pro-
tocol were introduced in Section 5, being Database and Dijkstra’s
shortest-path. Additionally, we use the Millionaires Problem for
evaluation of our naïve SGX-enabled SFE and SGX-enabled SFE pro-
tocols.18 We now present configurations of each test program, with
additional detail for hybrid versions of Database and Dijkstra.19
17The default maximum heap size (or total memory available for dynamic allocation)
of an enclave is 1 MB. Any further allocation would either trigger an out-of-memory
error if the application is in an ECall, or crash the enclave and application.
18We use the Millionaires Problem only to illustrate the differences in performance
of our naïve SGX-enabled SFE/SGX-enabled SFE protocols and pure GC. We do not
implement a hybrid version, but not due to its incompatibility with hybrid computation.
19In Section 5, we provided intuition for extending the hybrid versions of Database
and Dijkstra into further rounds. That discussion was meant primarily to demonstrate
that SFE could be achieved for functions requiring more than two rounds. We keep our
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Time (ms)
Program Naïve SGX-enabled SFE Hybrid GC
Millionaires1024 113 ± 3% 114 ± 2% - 697 ± 2%
Millionaires4096 111 ± 2% 110 ± 2% - 1,640 ± 1%
Millionaires16384 116 ± 3% 114 ± 3% - 5,468 ± 0.2%
Millionaires262144 121 ± 2% 121 ± 2% - 82,960 ± 0.4%
Dijkstra20 112 ± 4% 118 ± 4% 1,814 ± 0.2% 1,086 ± 0.4%
Dijkstra50 111 ± 3% 115 ± 3% 1,820 ± 0.2% 4,788 ± 0.1%
Dijkstra100 112 ± 2% 120 ± 3% 2,333 ± 0.2% 20,023 ± 0.02%
Dijkstra200 117 ± 2% 128 ± 1% 6,560 ± 0.2% 78,905 ± 0.02%
Dijkstra250 119 ± 2% 133 ± 1% 23,330 ± 0.2% 122,990 ± 0.009%
Dijkstra1000 125 ± 2% 343.9 ± 0.7% 51,670 ± 0.1% 1,972,700 ± 0.04%
Dijkstra10000 412.8 ± 0.6% 21,211 ± 0.03% 215,940 ± 0.09% X
Linear Tree
Database500x2500 123 ± 4% 150.9 ± 0.7% 1,663.0 ± 0.09% 18,250 ± 0.2% 327,390 ± 0.01%
Database1000x2500 116 ± 3% 224 ± 1% 3,218.6 ± 0.09% 45,020 ± 0.1% 631,200 ± 0.05%
Database1500x5000 117 ± 1% 356.2 ± 0.3% 8,300.1 ± 0.05% 112,800 ± 0.2% X
Database5000x5000 116.4 ± 0.9% 1,398 ± 0.1% 31,037 ± 0.05% 351,800 ± 0.2% X
Database5000x25000 146 ± 1% 3,538.5 ± 0.03% 91,919 ± 0.04% 1,690,000 ± 0.1% X
Table 1: Execution times (in ms) for each protocol, benchmarked with the Unix time command. All SGX programs were run
for 100 iterations, and GC programs were run for 10 iterations. X’s represent runs that would not complete in a timely manner.
-’s indicate programs we did not run due to hybrid Millionaires not being implemented.
Database. The database holds 64-bit entries. We experiment using
both the tree-based ORAM (described in Section 6) and a simple
linear search for comparison (marked as tree and linear in Table 1).
For example, Database500x2500 executes 2,500 select20 queries on
500 entries. This program demonstrates the time it would take to
use a database in a larger application with our protocols. As many
programs set and modify entries of the database multiple times in
the same run, we have more queries than the size of the database
in our tests to explore the efficiency as the query size increases.
For our tests, we establish 5% of the queries to be highly-sensitive
and only ever entered into the garbled circuit in even rounds.
Dijkstra. The graph contains n nodes, each with 4 edges. Edge
weights are 32 bits. For example, Dijkstra20 considers 20 nodes.
To test this setup, we define the number of (1) nodes in the
less sensitive portion of the graph, (2) nodes in the more sensitive
portion of the graph, and (3) entrances and exits from the more
sensitive portion of the graph. Depending on the start and end
points, a route may or may not need to traverse the sensitive portion
of the graph. Even if the route does not, we evaluate the circuit to
avoid leaking information about the path computed in the enclave.
Test cases are labeled according to the number of nodes in the
less sensitive graph. We run the following tests: for the 20-node less
sensitive graph, we consider 12-entrances or exits to the sensitive
graph and a 20-node sensitive graph. We also run similar tests with
the following configurations: 50 (12, 20), 100 (22, 25), 200 (32, 50),
250 (42, 100), 250 (42, 100), 1000 (52, 150), and 10000 (62, 250).
Millionaires. Inputs are two n-bit unsigned integers. Output is a
single bit, informing each party whose input is larger. For example,
Millionaires1024 takes 1024 bits of input from each party.
evaluation versions of these applications at two rounds, as this is sufficient to show
the overhead of transitioning between SGX and GC evaluation.
20The time-complexity for set and select queries is the same in this setup, though it
requires the addition of an extra 64 bits of input per set.
8.2 Results
Table 1 presents our results, which we summarize below.
Hybrid SFE-SGX vs. GC-based SFE. By only requiring part of the
computation to use a garbled circuit, we can increase performance
by up to 38x versus pure GC-based SFE in the case of Dijkstra with
1000 nodes. The Database application also demonstrated noticeable
improvements, being 18x faster in the 500x2500 case.
Although the hybrid SFE-SGX protocol requires more rounds
of computation by virtue of the splitting between even (GC) and
odd (SGX) rounds, it achieves less communication overhead than
pure GC-based SFE. In odd rounds, the amount of data exchange is
much smaller, with there being no oblivious transfer or relaying
back of lengthy garbled outputs. The enclave owner may commu-
nicate with its enclave at little or no cost, while the other party
may communicate with the enclave over the secure channel. This
exchange handled in the odd rounds lets us reduce the size of the
garbled circuit transmitted in even rounds.
The increase in performance is also dependent upon the size of
the computation, determined by each user’s requirements for their
data. We expect the improvement would be even more substantial
for Dijkstra10000 and larger database cases which were not run.
Hybrid SFE-SGX vs. SGX-enabled SFE. Our hybrid SFE-SGX pro-
tocol combines garbled circuits with SGX-enabled SFE, which in-
cludes side-channel protections. All else being the same, use of a
garbled circuit results in a performance reduction vs. SGX-enabled
SFE by up to 150x in the worst case, Dijkstra with 1000 nodes.
SGX-enabled SFE vs. GC-based SFE. Our SGX-enabled SFE proto-
col is up to 5736x faster than a pure GC execution of Dijkstra1000.
In the worst case, the SGX-enabled SFE program is only 6x faster;
this is for the smallest experiment, a Millionaires program with
1024 bits of input. In larger programs, our results show drastic
improvements compared to the garbled circuit implementation.
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SGX-enabled SFE vs Naïve SGX-enabled SFE. Our results show,
unsurprisingly, that without memory protections, the naïve SGX-
enabled SFE protocol outperforms the SGX-enabled SFE protocol for
both Dijkstra and Database, due to the necessity of hiding the mem-
ory access pattern in SGX-enabled SFE, by anywhere from 1.04x (for
Dijkstra50) to 630x (for Database5000x25000 with Tree ORAM).
The runtime for Millionaires is almost the same for both protocols.
ORAM vs Linear Search. Our results show that the overhead of
the tree ORAM we created is not competitive with a simple linear
search for the program sizes we were able to test; this is somewhat
surprising given the difference in the fraction of the database that
must be searched. The speed of the tree-based ORAM was reduced
(from the typicalO(polyloд(n)) complexity for ORAM schemes) for
several reasons, including increased time to delete each node from
the tree, and time to mix the node data after it has been removed
from the tree (O(n2)-time complexity). Thus the linear search is
faster for an array database due to a number of factors including
the overhead of the ORAM, branch prediction, and caching.
9 RELATEDWORK
SFE Computation on secure data has long been a goal of the theory
and systems communities. Mechanisms such as Yao’s garbled circuit
protocol [68] provided proof that arbitrary secure computation was
possible, but proved too inefficient for practical use. More than two
decades later, Fairplay [41] provided the first practically efficient im-
plementation of this construction. Since then, a variety of GC-based
SFE protocols have been developed in the semi-honest [25, 37, 38],
covert [4, 21, 43] and malicious [36, 39, 55] adversarial models. Com-
bined with other efforts to reduce bandwidth [13, 32] and circuit
size [8, 35], execution times of applications using garbled circuits
for secure computation have dropped by over five orders of mag-
nitude in the last decade. A range of privacy-preserving versions
of applications have thus been created, including databases [20],
navigation [13, 66], biometrics [11, 14], and genomics [25]. How-
ever, these applications still introduce substantial computational
overhead. Bahmani et. al [5] share our goal of using SGX to achieve
secure computation but leave the entire computation to the enclave.
Ohrimenko et. al [45] similarly rely entirely on SGX for multi-party
machine learning. We realize the limitations of such a naïve usage
of SGX and instead propose partition-relative SFE that combines
SGX with garbled circuits for stronger assurances.
SGXMost SGX solutions are in favor of putting the whole appli-
cation or libOS into an enclave, including Haven [6], SCONE [2],
Graphene-SGX [61], and Ryoan [26], putting full trust into SGX
and holding a large TCB inside the enclave. While Intel SGX SDK
and Panoply [57] mandate program partitioning to minimize the
TCB, the assumption is the security guarantee of enclaves would
not be compromised. A number of attacks have been demonstrated
against SGX. AsyncShock [64] exploits synchronization bugs in en-
claves using a pre-release version of the Intel SGX SDK. Controlled-
channel attacks [67] use memory access patterns to exfiltrate sensi-
tive information from secure enclaves. Cache-based side-channel
attacks [10, 52] are also shown possible. Other side-channel vulnera-
bilities [65] are also found within the Integrated Performance Prim-
itives (IPP) cryptographic library used by Intel SGX SDK. Micro-
architecture attacks have also proven to work on enclaves; these
include Meltdown [40] and Spectre [33]. Foreshadow [62] attacks
extract the attestation key from enclaves thus breaking SGX remote
attestation. All these attacks show that SGX can be compromised.
Countermeasures include T-SGX [29], SGX-Shield [53], ROTE [42],
Sanctum [18], etc., ranging from software enhancement to hardware
changes.While these defenses are useful to secure SGX applications,
our hybrid approach allows SGX to be compromised by leveraging
SFE to secure the most sensitive computation.
Others Employing the SGX enclave to securely perform some or
all of the evaluation of a function f echoes secure outsourcing.
Chaum and Pedersen first proposed the idea of outsourcing using
“wallets with observers” [15]. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya in-
troduced the untrusted but much more computationally powerful
worker [24]. Follow-on works founded the idea of a verifiable, out-
sourceable computation scheme [22] and further improved on this
idea [19, 46, 54]. Tramèr et al. [60] previously modeled the enclave
as a black-box, albeit in a weaker sense, by keeping only critical
functionalities secret from the host. Town Crier [70] also treats
the enclave as a black-box, trusted for confidentiality and integrity.
From a theoretical standpoint, our notion of partition-relative SFE
is closely related to the study of non-simultaneous SFE initiated by
Halevi, Lindell, and Pinkas [23]. Their result justifies our assertion
that the notion of partition-relative SFE is the strongest-possible
security objective in our setting.
10 CONCLUSION
Secure function evaluation (SFE) allowsmutually distrusting parties
to compute the result of a function without leaking anything to
others but suffers from large runtime overhead. Intel SGX provides
a natural environment for secure computation, but side-channel
and micro-architecture attacks can leak data from enclaves. We
propose a hybrid approach to combine SFE and SGX, by formalizing
what it means to partition the computation of a function f into
a piece evaluated with SGX and another piece evaluated using
SFE (garbled circuits). We defined secure evaluation of a function
relative to such a partitioning of that function and proved our
scheme achieves this notion. Our comprehensive evaluation of two
case studies shows that we achieve a 38x speedup over traditional
garbled circuit methods with our SGX-enabled SFE and points to a
way to ensure safer and faster secure computation.
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ExpsfeΠ,𝒫, f ,i (𝒜, 𝒮, k )
c ← $ {0, 1}
(a, b, σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k , f )
if (a, b) < domf then return ⊥
(L0, L1, L𝒪) ← $ Π.Init(1k ); (a, b, y0, y1) ← $ Exec𝒫,k (a, b)
(z0, z1, π , st′) ← $ Π(1k , a, b, ε )
if c = 1 then ω ← ViewiΠ,k (π )
else if i = Alice then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , a, len(b), y0)
else if i = Bob then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , len(a), b, y1)
c′← $𝒜(guess, σ , ω)
return (c = c′)
Expsfe-oddΠ, f ,i (𝒜, 𝒮, k )
c ← $ {0, 1}
(a, b, st, σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k , f )
if (a, b, st) < domf then return ⊥
(L0, L1, L𝒪) ← $ Π.Init(1k )
(y0, y1, π , st′) ← $ Π(1k , a, b, st)
if c = 1 then ω ← ViewiΠ,k (π )
else if i = Alice then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , a, |b |, y0, |st |)
else if i = Bob then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , |a |, b, y1, |st |)
c′← $𝒜(guess, σ , ω)
return (c = c′)
Exppriv𝒢 (𝒜, 𝒮, k )
c ← $ {0, 1}
(f , x, σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k )
if x < domf then return ⊥
if c = 1 then (F , e, d) ← $ Gb(1k , f ); X ← En(e, x )
else (F , X , d ) ← $ 𝒮(1k , f , f (x ))
c′← $𝒜(guess, F , X , d, σ )
return (c = c′)
ExppfeΠ,i (𝒜, 𝒮, k )
c ← $ {0, 1}
(f , x, σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k )
if x < domf then return ⊥
(L0, L1, L𝒪) ← $ Π.Init(1k )
(y, ε, π , st′) ← $ Π(1k , f , x, ε )
if c = 1 then ω ← ViewiΠ,k (π )
else if i = Alice then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , f , |x |, ε )
else if i = Bob then ω ← $ 𝒮(1k , |f |, x, f (x ))
c′← $𝒜𝒪(guess, σ , ω)
return (c = c′)
Figure 9: Security notions for function evaluation (top-left), odd-round protocols (top-right), private garbling schemes (bottom-
left), and private function evaluation (bottom-right). Let Π = (Init,Proc,𝒪) be an oracle protocol and 𝒢 = (Gb, En, Ev,De) be a
garbling scheme. See the Appendix for additional notation.
A APPENDIX
Let [1..ℓ] denote the set of integers from 1 to ℓ. If a is a vector over
strings, let len(a)[i] = |a[i]| for every i ∈ [1..|a|]. A function ϵ(·)
is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·), there exists a k0
such that for every k ≥ k0, it holds that ϵ(k) < 1/p(k). Both an
adversary and a simulator are randomized algorithms.
A.1 Protocols
We define syntax and execution semantics for two-party proto-
cols in which one or both players have access to an explicitly
defined oracle. An oracle-relative, two-party protocol is a triple
Π = (Init,Proc,𝒪) where Init and Proc are randomized algorithms
and 𝒪 is an oracle. Let 0 and 1 denote the (non-oracle) protocol
parties.
Fix security parameter k ≥ 0. Algorithm Init takes as input 1k
and outputs a triple of strings (L0,L1,L𝒪) called the long-term
inputs of parties 0, 1 and oracle 𝒪 respectively. This is written
(L0,L1,L𝒪) ← $ Init(1k ).
Algorithm Proc takes as input the identity i of a message re-
cipient, their long-term input Li , their current state sti , and the
message m being delivered. It outputs a message m′ (to be sent
to 1− i), the coinswi used in the computation, the updated state st ′i ,
and an indication of whether to halt (⊥) or continue (⊤). The al-
gorithm is given oracle access to 𝒪(L𝒪, ·). On input (L𝒪,x), the
oracle performs some operation (specified by the protocol) on the
string x and its current state, updates its state, and returns a string
to the player. This is written (m′,wi , st ′i ,δ ) ← $ Proc𝒪i (Li , sti ,m)
where δ ∈ {⊥,⊤}.
Protocols are executed with respect to the players’ private inputs.
Executing the protocol with input (a0,a1), where a0 and a1 are
strings (or vectors over strings) means to initialize sti = (1k ,ai ) for
i ∈ {0, 1}, and facilitate the exchange of messages between 0 and 1
until both halt. More formally, the protocol consists of a sequence
of calls to Proc𝒪i (·, ·, ·) alternating between i = 0 and i = 1. The
protocol specifies which player starts. This is denoted
(y0,y1,π , st ′) ← $ Π(1k ,a,b, st).
The transcript consists of the inputs 1k , a0, a1, and st, the outputs of
each call to Proc, and all of the oracle queries made by Proc, along
with their responses.
Letω = ViewiΠ,k (π ) denote the view of player i for the particular
execution of Π transcribed by π . In particular, string ω encodes i’s
initial state, and the portions of π that correspond to an execution
Proc𝒪i (·, ·, ·), i.e. those corresponding to party i .
Composing oracle protocols. Let (Π1, . . . ,Πℓ) be a sequence
of protocols. A protocol Π constructed from their composition
is defined as follows. The initialization algorithm Π.Init executes
each Πj .Init and returns the triple (L0, L1, L𝒪) where L0[j] (resp.
L1[j] and L𝒪[j]) denotes the long-term input of player 0 (resp.
player 1 and oracle Πj .𝒪) in protocol Πj . Executing Π on inputs
(1k ,a0,a1, st), where a0 and a1 are strings (or vectors over strings)
means to iteratively execute Πj for each j from 1 to ℓ on inputs spec-
ified by the protocol, except that st is the initial state of oracle Π1.𝒪.
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During the execution ofΠj , the algorithmΠj .Proc is given oracle ac-
cess to Πj .𝒪(L𝒪[j], ·). The output is the tuple (y0,y1,π , st ′) where
y0 and y1 are the final states of players 0 and 1 respectively after
executing Πℓ , string π = (π1, . . . ,πℓ), where πj is the transcript of
the j-th protocol, and st ′ is the final state of oracle Πℓ .𝒪. Finally,
let ViewiΠ,k (π ) = (ViewiΠj ,k (πj ))
ℓ
j=1.
A.2 Garbling schemes
A garbling scheme 𝒢 = (Gb, En, Ev,De) is projective if e (the second
output of the garbling algorithm) is a sequence (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n )
of strings called tokens such that En(e,x) = (Xx11 , . . . ,Xxnn ) where
x = x1 · · · xn .
Let 𝒢 be a projective garbling scheme, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗
be a function, and (F , e,d) be a triple of strings in the range of
Gb(1k , f ). Let ℓ ≤ n be an integer, and let r = n − ℓ. Then
if a ∈ {0, 1}ℓ ,b ∈ {0, 1}r , and x = a ∥ b, we define EnA(e,a)
and EnB(e,b) so that En(e,x) = EnA(e,a) ∥ EnB(e,b). That is,
EnA(e,a) = (Xa11 , . . . ,Xaℓℓ ) and EnB(e,b) = (X
b1
ℓ+1, . . . ,X
br
n ).
PRIV. We specify the simulation-based notion of [9] (instantiated
in our setting) in the bottom-left panel of Figure 9. This game
captures an adversary’s advantage in distinguishing the output
of the garbling algorithm on input (f ,x) from the output of the
simulator on input (f , f (x)). A garbling scheme is “secure” if for
every reasonable adversary, there exists a simulator such that this
advantage is “small”. Intuitively, this captures the idea that if a
garbling scheme is secure, then possession of the garbled function,
garbled input, and the final output leaks only a negligible amount
information about the input x to the circuit evaluator. We define the
advantage of𝒜 in the game with simulator 𝒮 at security parameter
k as
Advpriv𝒢 (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 2 · Pr
[
Exppriv𝒢 (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
− 1.
We say that 𝒢 is private if for every polynomial-time adversary 𝒜,
there exists a polynomial-time simulator 𝒮 such that the function
Advpriv𝒢 (𝒜,𝒮,k) is a negligible function of k .
A.3 1-2 oblivious transfer
A 1-2 transfer protocol is a two-party protocol Π played by Alice
and Bob with the following correctness condition: when executed
with Bob’s private input b = b1 · · ·bn ∈ {0, 1}n and Alice’s private
input of a sequence of tokens (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ), it holds that
Pr
[
OutBobΠ,k ((X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ),b) = (Xb11 , . . . ,Xbnn )
]
= 1
and
Pr
[
OutAliceΠ,k ((X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ),b) = ε
]
= 1 ,
where |X 0j | = |X 1j | for each j ∈ [1..n].
We define oblivious transfer (OT) in the presence of a semi-
honest adversary. Following [9, section 7.1], we formulate the se-
curity of OT as an instance of private function evaluation, or PFE.
Here Alice has private function f and Bob has a private input x in
the domain of f . The goal is that Bob learns f (x) without learning
anything about f (except | f |) and Alice learns noting about x (ex-
cept |x |). In the case of 1-2 OT, the private function corresponds
to the map b 7→ (Xb11 , . . . ,Xbnn ) (and hence encodes Alice’s tokens)
and the private input is Bob’s string b. The length of this map is a
function of |(X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n )|.
PFE. Security is captured by an experiment defined in the bottom-
right of Figure 9 associated to player i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, adversary𝒜,
and simulator 𝒮 . If i = Alice, the goal of the adversary is to distin-
guish Alice’s view from the output of 𝒮 , which is given as input
the security parameter, the function, and the length of Bob’s pri-
vate input. If i = Bob, the goal of the adversary is to distinguish
player Bob’s view from the output of 𝒮 , which is given as input the
security parameter, the input x , the value f (x), and the length of
the private function. The advantage of 𝒜 in the game instantiated
with simulator 𝒮 at security parameter k is defined as
AdvpfeΠ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 2 · Pr
[
ExppfeΠ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
− 1.
We say that Π is PFE-secure if for each i ∈ {Alice,Bob} and ev-
ery polynomial-time adversary 𝒜, there exists a polynomial-time
simulator 𝒮 such that the function AdvpfeΠ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) is a negligible
function of k .
OT. We say that a 1-2 transfer protocol is oblivious if it is a secure
PFE protocol.
A.4 Symmetric encryption
We give the standard concrete security notion for symmetric en-
cryption. A symmetric encryption scheme Γ is a triple of ran-
domized algorithms (𝒦, ℰ ,𝒟). Algorithm 𝒦 outputs a string K
called the key. Algorithm ℰ takes as input the key K , a mes-
sageM ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a ciphertextC ∈ {0, 1}∗. Algorithm𝒟
takes as input the key K , a ciphertext C , and deterministically
outputs the messageM . Correctness demands that for key K and
every message M (in the implicit message space), it holds that
Pr [C ← $ ℰK (M) : 𝒟K (C) = M ] = 1.
IND$. We associate to an adversary and encryption scheme an
experiment in which the adversary is given an oracle, which it
may query any number of times. After interacting with its oracle,
it outputs a bit. We define the advantage of an adversary 𝒜 in
attacking Γ as
Advind$Γ (𝒜) = Pr
[
K ← $𝒦 : 𝒜ℰK (·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
𝒜$(·) = 1
]
where oracle $(·) outputs a random bit string of appropriate length,
i.e. as long as a ciphertext corresponding to the query would be.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5.1
It suffices to prove the following claim: Let fj = 𝒫 . fj for every
j ∈ [ℓ] and let i ∈ {Alice,Bob}. Let 𝒜 be an adversary and 𝒮o
and 𝒮e be simulators. There exist adversaries ℬo and ℬe and a
simulator 𝒮 such that
AdvsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) ≤ 2
⌈ℓ/2⌉∑
h=1
Advsfe-oddΠo[f2h−1],f2h−1,i (ℬo,𝒮o,k)
+ 2
⌊ℓ/2⌋∑
h=1
AdvsfeΠe[f2h ],ℐ,f2h,i (ℬe,𝒮e,k).
Moreover, if𝒜, 𝒮o, and 𝒮e are polynomial-time, then so are ℬo, ℬe,
and 𝒮 .
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We first construct the adversary ℬo from𝒜 and the simulator 𝒮
from 𝒮o and 𝒮e. Let j ∈ [1..ℓ] be odd. We sketch the construction
of adversary ℬo on input for odd-round function fj . Let ℬo be the
adversary specified in Figure 10. In its pick phase, adversary ℬo
is given as input (1k , fj ). It first executes 𝒜 in its pick phase on
input of the security parameter and f . When 𝒜 outputs (a,b,σ )
where (a,b) ∈ domf and σ ∈ {0, 1}∗, adversary ℬo splits a and b
according to 𝒫 , then evaluates f according to 𝒫 up to the (j − 1)-th
round. It returns the appropriate inputs to the j-th round as its
choice and specifies (σ , j) as its state to carry-over to the next phase
of the game. Let (u,v, st, (σ , j)) denote ℬo’s output.
Let d denote the challenge bit in the SFE-ODD game played
by ℬo. In its guess phase, adversary ℬo gets as input a string ω,
which is player i’s view of Πo[fj ] executed on input (1k ,u,v, st)
if d = 1, and the output of the simulator (given player i’s inputs)
otherwise. Adversary ℬo flips a coin d ′. If it comes up heads, then it
emulates 𝒜 in the SFE game when its challenge bit is 1; otherwise
it emulates 𝒜 in the SFE game instantiated with a simulator 𝒮 ,
which is specified by ℬo. In particular, player i’s view of odd-round
protocol executions is simulated by 𝒮o and even-round protocol
executions are simulated by 𝒮e.
Finally, adversary ℬo substitutes the (possibly-simulated) view
of the j-th round execution with its own input ω. It then executes
𝒜’s guess phase on input of the emulated view and 𝒜’s carry-over
state σ . When 𝒜 outputs its guess c ′, adversary ℬout outputs c ′.
If d = 1 and d ′ = 1, then the reduction perfectly emulates
𝒜 in the SFE game when its challenge bit is 1; on the other
hand, if d = 0 and d ′ = 0, then the reduction perfectly emu-
lates 𝒜 instantiated with 𝒮 with the challenge bit being 0. Let
X j = Expsfe-oddΠo[fj ],fj ,i (ℬo,𝒮o,k). By construction, we have that
Pr
[
X j = 1|d = 1,d ′ = 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 1
]
where c denotes the challenge bit in 𝒜’s game. Similarly, we have
Pr
[
X j = 1|d = 0,d ′ = 0
]
= Pr
[
ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 0
]
.
Hence, and since d and d ′ are independent,
Pr
[
X j = 1
] ≥ 14 (Pr [ ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 1 ]
+ Pr
[
ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 0
] )
=
1
2 · Pr
[
ExpsfeΠ,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
.
It follows that
2 · Advsfe-oddΠo[fj ],fj ,i (ℬo,𝒮o,k) ≥ Adv
sfe
Π,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k).
Now let j ∈ [1..ℓ] be even. Adversary ℬe is constructed from 𝒜
in a similar manner. (We skip the details for brevity.) It emulates the
same simulator 𝒮 emulated by ℬo. An identical argument yields
2 · AdvsfeΠe[fj ],ℐ,fj ,i (ℬe,𝒮e,k) ≥ Adv
sfe
Π,𝒫,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k).
Summing over all j ∈ [1..ℓ] yields the claim.
Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to our associated
technical report (anonymized for submission) for full proofs of
Theorems 5.2 and 5.3.
ℬo(pick, 1k , fj )
(a, b, σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k , f )
a← $ SpA(1k , a); b← $ SpB(1k , b); st, y0[0], y1[0] ← ε
for h ← 1 to j − 1 do
u ← a[h] ∥ y0[h − 1]; v ← b[h] ∥ y1[h − 1]
if h is odd then
(y0[h], y1[h], st) ← fh (u, v, st)
else
(y0[h], y1[h]) ← fh (u, v)
return (a[j] ∥ y0[j − 1], b[j] ∥ y1[j − 1], st, (σ , j))
ℬo(guess, 1k , ω, (σ , j))
d ′← $ {0, 1} # “Guess” our challenge bit.
(L0e, L1e, L𝒪e ) ← $ Πe .Init(1k ); st, y0 ← ε
for h ← 1 to ℓ do
u ← a[h] ∥ y0[h − 1]; v ← b[h] ∥ y1[h − 1]
if d ′ = 1 then
if h is odd then
(y0[h], y1[h], π , st) ← $ Πo[fh ](1k , u, v, st)
ωh ← ViewiΠo[fh ],k (π )
else # h is even
(y0[h], y1[h], π .st′) ← $ Πe[fh ](1k , u, v, ε )
ωh ← ViewiΠe[fh ],k (π )
else # d ′ = 0
if h is odd then
(y0[h], y1[h], st) ← fh (u, v, st)
if i = Alice then ωh ← $ 𝒮o(1k , u, |v |, y0[h], |st |)
else ωh ← $ 𝒮o(1k , |u |, v, y1[h], |st |)
else # h is even
(y0[h], y1[h]) ← fh (u, v)
if i = Alice then ωh ← $ 𝒮e(1k , u, |v |, y0[h])
else ωh ← $ 𝒮e(1k , |u |, v, y1[h])
ωj ← ω # Replace j-th round with our view.
c′← $𝒜(guess, σ , (ω1, . . . , ωℓ ))
return c′
Figure 10: Adversary ℬo for proof of Theorem 5.1. The par-
ties in the Πo protocol are given long-term inputs generated
in ℬo’s game. The parties in the Πe protocol are given the
long term inputs (L0e,L1e,L𝒪e ) generated by ℬo. Note that we
overload the syntax of the simulators by giving them strings
where they expect vectors over strings.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5.2
It suffices to prove the following: Let 𝒜 be an adversary and 𝒮𝒢
and 𝒮ot be simulators. For each i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, there exist a pair
of adversaries ℬ𝒢 and ℬot and a simulator 𝒮 such that
AdvsfeΠ,ℐ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) ≤ Adv
priv
𝒢 (ℬ𝒢 ,𝒮𝒢 ,k) + Adv
pfe
Πot (ℬot,𝒮ot,k).
Moreover, if 𝒜, 𝒮𝒢 , and 𝒮ot are polynomial-time, then so are ℬ𝒢 ,
ℬot, and 𝒮 .
Our argument follows closely the proof of [9, thm 14], except
that our goal is SFE. We begin with the case where i = Alice. It
suffices to specify ℬot and simulator 𝒮 such that
AdvsfeΠ,ℐ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) ≤ Adv
pfe
Πot (ℬot,𝒮ot,k).
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During its pick phase, adversary ℬot executes 𝒜 on its pick phase,
getting (a,b,σ ) in return. It then samples random coins w and
executes the garbling algorithm, specifying w as the coins of
execution. Let (F , e,d) denote the output. Define д as the map
b 7→ (Xbr
ℓ+1, . . . ,X
br
n ) where ℓ = |a |, r = |b |, n = ℓ + r , and
e = (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ). Finally, adversary ℬot returns (д,b,σ ).
Let ω denote the (possibly-simulated) view given to ℬot dur-
ing its guess phase. It constructs Alice’s view from w , ω, Y =
Ev(F , EnA(e,a) ∥ EnB(e,b)), and her initial state and executes 𝒜 in
its guess phase on the constructed view and its carry-over state σ .
Finally, return whatever 𝒜 returns. In doing so, adversary ℬot
perfectly emulates 𝒜 in its game instantiated with a simulator 𝒮
specified by the reduction and constructed from 𝒮ot.
We now turn to the case where i = Bob. First, we construct the
adversary ℬot from 𝒮ot and𝒜 as specified above. We construct ℬ𝒢
as follows. During its pick phase, adversary ℬ𝒢 executes 𝒜 in its
pick phase on input (1k , f ), getting (a,b,σ ) in return. Adversaryℬ𝒢
then returns (f , (a,b),σ ). On input (guess, F ,X ,d,σ ), adversaryℬ𝒢
does as follows. Since 𝒢 is projective, there exists a sequence of to-
kens e = (Z 01 ,Z 11 , . . . ,Z 0n ,Z 1n ) (unknown toℬ𝒢 ) such thatX = A ∥ B
where A = EnA(e,a) and B = EnB(e,b). Let r = |b | and write B as
the sub-sequence (B1, . . . ,Br ) of e . For each i ∈ [1..r ], let Xbii = Bi
and let X 1−bii be a random token. Let e
′ = (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ).
Execute
(ε,B,π , st ′) ← $ Πot(1k , e ′,b, ε)
and let ω ′ ← ViewBobΠot,k (π ). Adversary ℬ𝒢 constructs Bob’s view
from F , A, ω ′, and Bob’s initial state, then executes 𝒜 in its guess
stage with this view and its carry-over state σ . Finally, it outputs
whatever 𝒜 outputs.
Lastly, we specify the simulator 𝒮 as follows. On input
(1k , len(a), b, y) where a[1] = a, b[1] = b, and y[1] =
f (a,b), the simulator executes (F ,X ,d) ← $ 𝒮𝒢(1k , f , f (a,b)) and
ω ′← $ 𝒮ot(1k , |д |,b,B), where д is the map defined by b 7→
(Xb1
ℓ+1, . . . ,X
br
n ) for some set of tokens (X 01 ,X 11 , . . . ,X 0n ,X 1n ) out-
put by the garbling algorithm. (These lengths are known since the
simulator knows the function f .). It constructs Bob’s view from F ,
X , ω ′, and his initial state and returns it.
Since each of ℬot and ℬ𝒢 perfectly emulate𝒜 in its game instan-
tiated with 𝒮 , the claim holds.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 5.3
The theorem statement in the body is somewhat informal, since
we formalize IND$-security concretely instead of asymptotically.
(In particular, we do not associate a security parameter to the
IND$ game.) Nevertheless, the claim we prove here sufficient to
establish the theorem for the natural asymptotic definition.
We prove the following claim: Let 𝒜 be an adversary. For each
i ∈ {Alice,Bob}, there exists an adversary ℬ and a simulator 𝒮
such that for every k , it holds that
Advsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) ≤ Advind$Γ (ℬ)
Moreover, adversary ℬ has about the same runtime as 𝒜 and 𝒮
runs in constant time.
We start again with i = Bob. Bob’s view consists only of its initial
state and its coins for encrypting its message to Alice. Clearly there
exists a simulator 𝒮 such that Advsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 0.
Now consider Alice’s view. Fix a positive integer k . Adversary ℬ
first executes (a,b, st,σ ) ← $𝒜(pick, 1k , f ) and asks b of its oracle,
getting x in response. It then constructs Alice’s view ω from her
initial state, x , and y where (y, st ′) = f (a,b, st). It then executes
c ′← $𝒜(guess,ω,σ ) and returns c ′.
If ℬ has an encryption oracle, then it perfectly emulates 𝒜 in
its game with c = 1 as the challenge bit. If ℬ is a $(·) oracle, then
it perfectly emulates 𝒜 in its game with c = 0 and a simulator 𝒮
specified by the reduction. Hence,
Pr
[
K ← $𝒦 : ℬℰK (·) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 1
]
and
Pr
[
ℬ$(·) = 0
]
= Pr
[
Expsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1|c = 0
]
where i = Alice. Finally,
Advind$Γ (ℬ) = 2 · Pr
[
Expsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) = 1
]
− 1
= Advsfe-oddΠ,f ,i (𝒜,𝒮,k) .
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